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"That it is necessary for the national defense and for
the proper growth of its foreign and domestic commerce that
the United states shall have a merchant marine of the best
equipped and most suitable types of vessels sufficient to
carry the greater portion of its commerce and serve as a
naval or military auxiliary in time of war or national emer-
gency, ultimately to be owned and operated privately by cit-
izens of the United states; and it is hereby declared to be
the policy of the United states to do whatever may be neces-
sary to develop and encourage the maintenance of such a
merchant marine, and, insofar as may not be inconsistent
with the express provisions of this Act, the United states
Shipping Board shall, in the disposition of vessels and ship-
ping property as hereinafter provided, in the making of rules
and regulations, and in the administration of the shipping
laws keep always in view this purpose and object as the pri-
mary end to be obtained."
Section I, Merchant Marine Act
of 1920
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II INTRODUCTION
How important is the U.S. Merchant Marine to the govern-
ment and people of the United States? How much should be
sacrificed in favor of the continued existence of the mer-
chant marine? These are not fair questions because there are
no precise "correct" answers, nor need there be any. To put
a price tag on the merchant marine is unnecessary, and the
pricing process is likely to be unrealistic, incomplete, and
sUbject to widely diverse interpretation. Benefit/cost ana-
lyses with dollar cost estimates of various government aid
programs have been published, but truly quantifiable total
costs and benefits of the merchant marine are virtually im-
possible to derive at the present due to the lack of suffi-
cient information and inflated or prejUdicial reports. What
is really important is described concisely in the following:
"It has been decided that the United
States will have a merchant marine.
It will be required to operate only
expensive or inefficient tonnage,
and its consequent high ship and
labor costs will be offset by some
form of government support. This
has been basically a political
decision. ,,1
Despite great expense and the declining state of our
merchant marine industry, there will be considerable support
for the idea of maintaining and restoring the U.S. Merchant
Marine for some time to come. Realizing this, the question
now becomes, "If we are committed to the support of the U.S.
1
Merchant Marine, how can we make this support effective and
the merchant marine more efficient and competitive?" It
would be ambitious to treat the entire subject of aid to the
merchant marine. This discussion will concentrate on the
form of federal aid known as Cargo Preference, as this has
become the principal (if not the most costly) form of fed-
eral assistance applicable to all U.S. flag vessels.
Leading with a brief discussion of the need for federal
aid in general, the background, impact, and prospects for the
future of cargo preference will be examined. It will be
demonstrated that federal aid, particUlarly in the form of
Cargo Preference,is required to maintain the merchant
marine. It will also be demonstrated that federal aid and
policy in its present form is not sufficient to promote
growth. There needs to be significant improvement in this
area if the maritime industry is to become a successful and
vital force once again. Though cargo preference comprises
only one part of the government's program, it serves to il-
lustrate what is both good and bad about the conditions
under which the U.S. Merchant Marine exists.
"the international political and economic
benefits associated with U.S. shipping
might not individually warrant federal sup-
port ... the collective value of these bene-
fits is substantial and represents a major
offset against the cost to the Nation of
maintaining the essential maritime re-
source needed for security purposes."2
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II. IS FEDERAL AID NECESSARY?
Since the United States Merchant Marine was instituted,
"the thread of government policy used to strengthen the
nation's maritime industries was rarely broken."J_This con-
tinuing assistance by the federal government has occurred
for several very logical reasons. Primarily it is understood
that, "national defense, development of commerce, and protec-
tion of American interests, ,,4 are paramount. Of those
reasons, the national defense/security role of the merchant
marine is generally agreed to be the most tangibly important
and in itself may provide sufficient justification for
government support. 5
"The most compelling justification of a
government-supported merchant marine is
position as a military auxiliary .•. the
experience of two World Wars and Viet
Nam has convinced many observers ••. of
the military value of a merchant marine.,,6
It makes sense that for security purposes and during war-
time or national emergency the U.S. would desire to exclus-
ively utilize U.S. flag vessels for the carriage of military
and sensitive cargoes. Without a U.S. Merchant Marine, the
country would have to depend on the whims of foreign mer-
chants, which would be a ludicrous policy. Even the critics
of the merchant marine recognize its inestimable worth as a
component of national security.
From an economic viewpoint, the U.S. Merchant Marine does
J
contribute in a small, yet favorable way to the nation's bal-
ance of payments. Other claimed benefits include maintenance
of a source of employment and the presence of an industrial
infrastructure.? Overall, the economic argument is weak, but
the weakness of the economic argument provides a strong
reason for federal support. Due to the inability of the mer-
chant marine to compete on its own and our commitment towards
having a merchant marine, the necessity of federal assist-
ance becomes apparent.
"If an American industry is to compete internationally,
it must somehow offset the additional costs associated with
operating within the U.S. economy."S This "offset" comes
through federal aid to the merchant marine and may assume
various forms (see Table 1). Federal assistance is always
costly, but, "In an industry as highly competitive as inter-
national shipping, any government that desires to maintain a
national flag merchant fleet literally has no option but to
adopt some of the •.. practices.,,9 Because the United States
Merchant Marine has to trade in an international environment~
it is important to understand the nature of that environment.
"International shipping does not operate in a free and
open market. It has never done so."lO Though this fact may
seem obvious to most observers, some of the country's policy-
makers unbelievably have little knowledge of the extent of
this tremendous hurdle which faces U.S. flag vessels. Free-
dom in the international shipping market is the ideal situa-
tions, but is prevented from existing by one or more of the
following practices:
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TABLE 1
Summary of Major GovernmentJrograms 1974
_ n' _, , Body of Approximate Major Purpose or
Progr~s Enforcement Recipients Annual Cost Requirement
Construction Maritime Subsidy All U.S. Citizen $199 million Up to 50% of
Differential Subsidy Board-MarAd U.S. flag cost for com--
(CDS) (Title V) vessels in the f)etitive' bd..dding
foreign commerce contracts, 35%
of the U.S. for negotiated
contracts
Operating Differential
Subsidy (ODS) (Title
VI)
Mortgage Guarantee
(Title XI)
Maritime Subsidy
MarAd
Division of Ship
Financing
Guarantees-MarAd
U.S. flag vessels
operating on es-
sential foreign
trade routes '
(liners) since
1970 also bulk
carriers
All U.S. built
vessels (ocean
and inland)
$258 million
Up to 87.5% of
actual costs
(75% for sub-
sidized) $7
billion 25-year
financing program
limit (1975)
Cost parity pay-
ments covering
differential
cost of crew
(repair and
maintenance
until 1975) etc
U.S. construe..;
tion for U.S.
flag vessel
operation
U.S. construc-
tion for U.S.
flag vessel
operation
Government
ownedcandy'or-
financed cargo
$400 million
All U.S. built
vessels re-
ceiving Title XI
All U.S. flag
vessels (in-
cluding sub-
sidized)
Division of Ship
Guarantees-MarAd
PL-480, Dept of
Agriculture,
AID, Dept of
State, Other
government cargoes,
various departments
such as Defense
Construction Loan
Guarantee
Cargo Preference
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continued TABLE 1
Capital Construction
Fund (tax exempt)
Ship Exchange Program
Ship Trade In Program
Investment Tax Credit
Research and Develop~
ment
Cabotage
War Risk Insurance
Internal Revenue
Service
Office of Domestic
Shipping-MarAd
Office of Domestic
Shipping-MarAd
Internal Revenue
Service
Admin for Commercial
Development-MarAd
Jones Act, MarAd
MarAd (expired 1975)
All,U.S. citizen
owners who are
qualified operators
All U.S. citizen $24 million
owners who are
qualified
operators
All U.S. citizen $6 million
owners who are
qualified operators
All U.S. citizen owners
who are qualified
operators
All U.S. maritime $32 million
industry, most pro-
grams now based on
cost sharing
U.S. flag vessels with-
out subsidy
All vessels in U.S. trade
No withdrawal ex-
cept for purposes
of ship replace-
ment
U.S. built vessels
or U.S. flag ves-
sels may be ex-
changed for others
in NDRF
Subsidized operators
trade in replace-
ment vessel upon
delivery of new
subsidized ship
Investment in new
or used ships
Restriction of
vessels to
domestic routes
Sourcer U.S. Maritime Administration and Frankel, Ernst G. Regulation and Policies of American Shipping.
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" Subsidies;
- Open and hidden rebates
to shippers;
- Shipping discriminations;
- Cargo reservations for
national flag ships;
- "Open" and "closed" con-
ferences to regulate
freight rates on specific
trade routes;
- Rate wars; and
- Bilateral shipping agreements ... ,,11
Additionally the appearance of state-owned shipping companies
(particularly Eastern Bloc states) has had a profound effect
on the flow of trade and the pricing structure of shipping. 12
All maritime nations exert some supportive influence on their
own maritime industries, and most forms of aid are more exten-
sive than those espoused by the United States. It seems fair
that a country would desire to ensure the success of its own
merchant marine. To achieve this success, foreign interests
have been furthered by the use of what may be called "dis-
criminatory" practices. From Table 2 it may be seen that
Cargo Preference is the most popular type of assistance by
maritime nations to their shipping industries. The "favorable
impact"l] that foreign Cargo Preference policies have upon
their maritime concerns is appreciable, While, "The U.S.
preference laws affect only a small fraction of the nation's
commerce. ,,14
In this initial discussion the need for federal aid and
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TABLE 2
X
X
** X X
** X X
*** X X X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Loans
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Which Nations
in 1978
Low
Interest LoansInterest
x
X
X
X
X
X
X
**
x
**
X
**
X
Operating
Subsidies and Other Types of Assistance
Gave to Their Maritime Industries
Subsidies
ConstructionCountry
Algeria*
Argentina*
Australia*
Belgium
Brazil*
Canada
Chile*
Colombia
Cyprus
Denmark
Ecudor*
Egypt, Arab Republic of*
Finland
France*
Garbon*
Germany, Federal Republic of
Ghana*
Greece
India*
Indonesia*
Iran*
Iraq*
Ireland*
Israel*
Italy*
Japan
Korea, South
Kuwait*
Lebanon
Liberia*
Libya*
Malaysia*
Mexico*
Morocco*
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Continued TABLE 2
Subsidies Low
Country Operating Construction Interest Interest Loans Loans
Netherlands X X X
New Zealand*
Nigeria
Norway ** X
Pakistan* X X
Panama
Peru* X X X
Philippines*
Portugal* X X
Saudi Arabia XSingapore*
South Africa* X X XSpain* X X XSweden* *~ X
Switzerland
Taiwan* XThailand*
Turkey* XUnited Arab Emirates*
United Kingdom.* ** X
United States X X XUruguay*
Venezuela*
Zaire
9
Continued TABLE 2
Accelerated Cargo Cabotage
Country Tax Benefits Depreciation Preference Restrictions Others
Algeria* X
Argentina* X X
Australia* X X X
Belgium X X X
Brazil* X X X X
Canada X X X
Chile* X X X
Colombia X X X
Cyprus X
Denmark X X X
Ecuador* X X
Egypt, Arab Republic of* X X
Finland X X X X X
France* X X X X X
Garbon* X
Germany, Federal Republic of X X
Ghana* X
Greece X X X
India* X X X
Indonesia* X
Iran* X
Iraq*
Ireland* X X
Israel* X X X
Italy* X X X X X
Japan X X
Korea, South X X X
Kuwait* X -,I
Lebanon X X
Liberia*
Libya*
Malaysia*' X
Mexico* X X
Morocco* X
Netherlands* X X X
New Zealand* X
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Continued TABLE 2
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
others
X
X
x
X
X
X
X
Cabotage
Restrictions
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Cargo
Preference
X
X
Accelerated
Depreciation
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Tax BenefitsCountry
Nigeria*
Norway
Pakistan*
Panama
Peru*
Philippines*
Portugal*
Saudi Arabia
Singapore
South Africa*
Spain*
Sweden*
Switzerland
Taiwan*
Thailand*
Turkey*
United Arab Emirates*
United Kingdom X
United States X X
Uruguay* X X
Venezuela* X
Zaire X
*State owned shipping lines and/or shipbuilding enterprises whose residual losses are covered
by government funds. Complete data are not available for the Soviet and Eastern European
communist countries' maritime industries except to note they are owned and tightly controlled
by the state, as are those of the People's Republic of China and a number of the developing
countries National merchant marines of less than 150,000 gross tons are excluded in this
compilation.
**Operating subsidies are granted in the public interest to maintain passenger and/or cargo
services to outlying islands. Commercial operation, without SUbsidy, could not be maintained.
***"Encouragement subsidies" to maritime transportation operating or using Korean flag ships in
international trades which contribute to earnings or to conserve foreign currencies.
Source: This chart is based entirely on the data for each country compiled by the Office of Inter-
national Activities, Maritime Government Printing Office, December 1978, and Heine, Irwin M.
The U.S. Maritime Industry in the National Interest.
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a strong shipping policy has been highlighted. There is in
fact, little disagreement concerning the need for the govern-
ment's support. What then becomes the issue is the matter
of what types of assistance will work for the U.S. Of all
forms of federal aid, it is believed that Cargo Preference
is the most universally palateable and the most consistent
with current trends of the "New Federalism" in U.S.
government.
12
III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF CARGO PREFERENCE
WHAT IS CARGO PREFERENCE?
Cargo Preference is, "a massive system of indirect aid to
both the subsidized and non-subsidized operators ••• it com-
pletely supports the operation of the tramp and unsubsidized
liner fleets, and the subsidized lines are dependent on it for
much of their cargo.,,15 Preference cargo is generally govern-
ment-generated cargo of which a certain percentage is required
to move on home flag vessels. There are two types of preference
which must be distinguished:
ROUTE PREFERENCE - preference cargo
moving on home flag vessels at inter-
nationally competitive rates.
RATE PREFERENCE - preference cargo
moving at rates above world market
rates.
The history of Cargo Preference in the U.S. is trace-
able through several key pieces of legislation. This legis-
lation became slightly more extensive as the years went by,
but stopped far short of the kind of thorough Cargo Preference
practiced by some of the more successful maritime nations.
There have been heated debates over the extent and applica-
bility of the Cargo Preference laws which have affected not
only the fate of these laws, but the fate of all U.S. maritime
legislation in recent years. Cargo Preference re-surfaces as
a major issue each time some overhaul of the U.S. maritime
policy is considered.
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CARGO PREFERENCE LEGISLATION
1904 - Military Transportation Act: "preference to U.S. flag
ships in the transportation of supplies for the Army and Navy
in direct support of American military establishments overseas.,,16
1934 - Public Resolution 17: "where loans are made to foster
exports of agricultural and other products, provision shall be
made to carry them exclusively in U.S. flag ships. An exception
would be permitted when the Maritime Administration certified
to the lending agency that such vessels were not available as
to numbers, tonnage capacity, sailing schedule, or at reason-
able rates. ,,17
1936 - Merchant Marine Act: "created certain classes of pre-
ference cargo - U.S. mail (Section 405, since repealed) and
federal employees required to travel on U.S. ships (Section
901a). ,,18
1954 - Public Law 480: Agricultural Trade Development and
Assistance Act (subsequently amended by Food for Peace Act in
1966), "provides for the overseas shipment of surplus U.S.
agricultural commodities under four titles:
Title I - Sales to foreign governments
for local currency;
Title II - Famine or other urgent relief
assistance;
Title III - (a) Bartering of surplus com-
modities for strategic
materials for U.S. stock-
piling programs; and
(b) The Food for Development
Program; and
14
Title IV - Added in 1959, provides long-term
credit to friendly foreign nations
for purchase of agricultural
commodities. ,,19
Under this law, the Department of Agriculture, "pays a
differential to operators based on the difference between the
contract rate and the international rate,"ZO which is more of
a direct sUbsidy.
Public Law 664: The Cargo Preference Act (or 50/50 Act),
incorporated as an amendment to the Merchant Marine Act of
1936 and itself amended in 1961, "intended to protect the
interests of liner or scheduled service, irregular or tramp
shipping, and tanker operations," and provides that, "at least
50 percent of the gross tonnage of certain government-generated
cargoes shall be transported on privately-owned U.S. flag
commercial vessels."Zl
1970 - Merchant Marine Act: Cargo Preference remained essen-
tially unchanged, but direct subsidies were extended to bulk
carrier operation~ inthe hopes of eventually eliminating rate
preference. The Administration of the Cargo Preference laws
was placed under the Maritime Administration for monitoring
and standardization purposes.Z3
1977 - Public Law 95-74: Strategic Petroleum Reserve Program,
"50 percent of oil purchased overseas for the program must be
shipped on U.S. flag vessels."Z4
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THE CARGO PREFERENCE DEBATES
In the period from 1965 to 1970, there was an ongoing
battle to formulate government policy in the face of maritime
union unrest and the steady decline of the merchant marine.
This period was particulary significant in the fate of Cargo
Preference. The debates that raged between interested parties
were illustrative of the typical bureaucratic policymaking pro-
cess, and Cargo Preference emerged as a major issue that di-
vided the maritime industry. The debate continues to this
day on a different scale.
John Kilgour, in The U.S. Merchant Marine: National
Maritime/Policy and Industrial Relations, does an outstanding
job of presenting all the aspects of the policy debate occur-
ring during the 1965 to 1970 period. The following discussion
of the Cargo Preference degates is condensed from that work
and concentrates on the Cargo Preference implications.
KEY PLAYERS IN THE GREAT DEBATE
The Johnson Administration: "pledged to come forward
with a program to revitalize the U.S. fleet.,,25
SIU-AMA: The Seafarers' International Union-American
Maritime Association, representing the position of the un-
subsidized shipping sector. AMA's primary function is
lobbying. 26
NMU-CASL: The National Maritime Union-Committee of
American Shipping Lines, representing the position of the
subsidized shipping sector. CASL is also a major lobby.27
Nicholas Johnson: Maritime Administrator from 1964 to
1966 "with no previous maritime experien~e."28
Alan Boyd: Secretary of Transportation under the Johnson
Administration, also with no previous maritime experience. 29
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Andrew Gibson: Maritime Administrator under the Nixon
Administration with an intimate knowledge of the maritime
industry.JO
MAC: Maritime Advisory Committee-representing a cross
section of labor and industry, formed to deal with policy
problems under the Johnson Administration. J l
IMTF: Interagency Maritime Task Force-representing
concerned governments agencies, formed to assist MAC in
hLevi 1" d "" J2ac l lng po lCy eC1Slons.
The Nixon Administration: promised "remedial measures
far more constructive and far more comprehensive than those
of his predecessor. J J
The background to the debate began in 196J when President
Kennedy promised to supply grain to the U.S.S.R. after that
country's catastrophic crop failure. The controversy over who
would ship the grain precipitated union dissention and ~ poten-
tially explosive situation. The unions and the industry in
general wanted to ensure that they would receive their "fair
share" of the grain traffic. To deal with this situation
President Johnson ordered the formation of a short-term
Grievance Committee and the long-term MAC to create future
policy. The Grievance Committee failed largely as a result
, of its differences·.with the powerful SIU. MAC was unable to
achieve any policy decisions and it soon became apparent that
something else was required. The Secretary of Commerce then
ordered the formation of the IMTF to "assist" MAC. In fact
the IMTF held an almost contrary position to MAC and served
more as a stimulus than a cooperative organization. The
Maritime Administrator Nicholas Johnson, used the IMTF to
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further the position of the Administration and encountered
vehement opposition from SIU.
The IMTF published a proposal which shocked the maritime
industry. In A New National Maritime Policy, the IMTF pro-
posed foreign building and the phasing out of all Cargo
Preference. This had several very direct implications. The
unsubsidized sector depended almost exclusively on Cargo Pre-
ference for its cargo and could not afford to have foreign
built ships in competition. As a result, the SIU-AMA con-
tingent shot into action to counter the proposal and to make
Nicholas Johnson's position untenable. Actually, it is thought
that the IMTF proposal made sense for the subsidized sector
although major restructuring would be required for the U.S.
Merchant Marine. The prospect of the loss of a large part of
the unsubsidized sector and the shake-up of the rest of the
industry proved highly distasteful to the industry and its
Congressional "mouth-pieces." The MAC, which had been pre-
viously inactive, felt obliged to pUblish its own proposal.
The MAC report, Maritime Policy and Program of the
United States, was "designed to generate agreement.,,34 What
the MAC report proposed was essentially the opposite of the
IMTF report, in that only U.S. building would be allowed and
only rate preference would be phased out (and that would
occur very gradually.) The MAC report was remarkable in that
it almost achieved a concensus in the maritime industry, al-
though it did little to propose improvement or changes in
U.S. policy.
Nicholas Johnson stood fast on his position, but was
fighting against all odds. In his campaign to sell the IMTF
proposal, Johnson made many industry enemies and more than a
18
few diplomatic mistakes. Due to intense pressure exerted by
the industry and its Congressional friends, Nicholas Johnson
was removed as Maritime Administrator. The fight for foreign
building was taken up by Johnson's "understudy" and new
Secretary of Transportation Alan Boyd.
Boyd's appearance on the scene as a proponent of foreign
building marks the emergence of Cargo Preference as the central
issue. Boyd proposed foreign building and retention of Cargo
Preference. The retention of Cargo Preference was intended to
placate SIU-AMA. What occurred as a result of this proposal was
the polarization of the two major unions SIU-AMA and NMU-CASL.
NMU-CASL favored the proposal because it served their interests
with lower cost ships and the ensurance of cargo in the form
of Cargo Preference. Unfortunately for Boyd, SIU-AMA was not
to be put off by the Cargo Preference concession. Foreign
building was still unacceptable to SIU-AMA, and now the union
wanted to expand Cargo Preference to commodities such as oil
and sugar. SIU-AMA was probably "feeling its oats" believing
that it could stall any progress in maritime policy until it
obtained its desires. NMU-CASL was becoming increasingly
annoyed at the SIU-AMA stand and came out in favor of the
elimination of rate preference. This would of course hurt only
the SIU-AMA contingent by denying them the higher-than-market
rates it depended on for existence. The debate was in full
swing with SIU-AMA and NMU-CASL squaring off.
A further complication for SIU-AMA was the Department of
Defense's proposition of competitive bidding for cargo. This
would leave the higher priced unsubsidized carriers high and
dry, while the NMU-CASL factions would be able to price their
19
services at more competitive rates. The SIU-AMA, which had
started out on the offensive, was now backed into a corner. To
counter the threat of the NMU-CASL and the D.D.D. proposal,
SIU-AMA proposed the elimination of the "double subsidy" the
practice of subsidized carriers receiving the additional bene~
fits of Cargo Preference. What SIU-AMA wanted was for the
carriage of preference cargo by unsubsidized ships alone.
During this controversy, foreign building had been lost
as an issue and Cargo Preference had become the overriding
concern despite Alan Boyd's futile attempts to impose the
foreign building program. Boyd was doomed to failure from the
beginning, learning little from the Nicholas Johnson lesson,
and was defeated before the Nixon Administration took over.
The Nixon Administration was heralded by considerable
optimism for the future of the U.S. Merchant Marine. The
Administration had a fairly realistic approach to the problem
which was aided by the wise choice of Andrew Gibson as Maritime
Administrator. Gibson had a great deal of first-hand know-
ledge of the industry and was an adept politician. The Nixon
Administration was able'to pass the Merchant Marine Act of
1970 with Gibson's aid in soothing the feelings of labor and
industry. The Merchant Marine Act of 1970 was a compromise in
in that it buried the issue of foreign building and put the
elimination of rate preference as a long-term goal. The
reason the Act was acceptable to SIU-AMA is that Gibson
promised that the unsubsidized bulk-trade operators would re-
ceive preference for subsidies under the Act's proposed
extension of subsidies. The Act was still imperilled by the
NMU-CASL/SIU-AMA feud over the "double subsidy" issue. In a
20
deft political move, this issue was sidetracked by referring
it to the Maritime Subsidy Board, allowing the Act to pass.
Though this ended the period of the debate, the problems of
union rivalry and the Cargo Preference issue continue to the
present. The "double subsidy" issue was decided in 1975 when
a court decision upheld the rule that a vessel receiving
Operating Differential Subsidy must carry at least 50% non-
preference cargo or experience a proportional reduction in its
subsidy.35
The most significant aspect of this debate is not the
personalities involved or even the period during which it
occurred. The important feature of the debate is the at-
mosphere in which maritime policy was created. The very
nature of the relationship between the maritime industry and
government has led to the decline of the U.S. Merchant Marine.
The intense combat between the different interests represented
caused them to forget the true goal of a strong U.S. Merchant
Marine which would be of benefit to all. "As long as tunnel-
vision lobbying and administrative response continue as the
modus operandi for American policymaking, American shipping
and shipbuilding will continue to stagnate.,,36
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RECENT EVENTS IN CARGO PREFERENCE
Cargo preference has become a popular topic, although
the practice has gained a great deal of opposition for
reasons explained in the "Impact of Cargo Preference"
chapter of this discussion. There are several significant
events which illustrate the trends in thinking about Cargo
Preference. These events all deal with attempts to expand
the applicability of preference laws.
When in 19?0 the Maritime Administration was appointed
to "'keep watch" over Cargo Preference , it could be seen that
controversy was in the making. It was thought at the time
that,the Maritime Administration's interests were linked too
closely with the fate of the merchant marine, and that the
Maritime Administration would be more likely to try to pro-
mote Cargo Preference for purposes of protection. This proved
to be true, and the Maritime Administration established a Cargo
Preference Control Center tOc£Rsure compliance with the laws. 3?
This caused problems to say the least, Primarily, the Maritime
Administration has no explicit authority over the application
of preference programs. Disputes with affected agencies arose
as a result of the attempted enforcement of Cargo Preference
laws and the lack of clearly defined legal limitations. The
Maritime Administration would like to see the Cargo Preference
laws applied to their maximum extent, but faces stiff opposi-
tion from producers of government-generated cargo who would
prefer to use cheaper foreign shipping. The Maritime Admini-
stration has done a fair job in the processing of information
it receives on preference cargo but is severely limited by
other agencies' non-compliance or inability to report statistics.
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In 1977 the Carter Administration, in trying to build
up the strategic Petroleum Reserve Program and to counter
the threat of the Energy Crisis, proposed increasing Cargo
Preference to cover all imported oil under H.R. 10)7. The
requirement for U.S. flag vessels to carry 9.5 or )0 per-
cent of the imported oil was considered. Both proposals
were extremely costly in terms of the differential between
U.S. and world market rates. H.R. 10)7 was overwhelmingly
defeated in Congress and the Strategic Petroleum Reserve
program itself was temporarily suspended in 1979. Fueled
by this success, opponents of Cargo Preference have become
increasingly vocal.
In 1982, H.R. 4627 - a Port Developments bill - had
Cargo Preference provisions attached to it that rekindled
the old debate over the nature of such provisions. In the
fight over the bill, the arguments against Cargo Preference
were that it was, "a protectionist wolf cloaked in the sheep's
clothing of national defense, "'and that,""its real purpose
was to prop up a sick American maritime industry, which can-
not begin to compete with its foreign counterparts.,,)8 This
line of attack on the national security benefits of Cargo
Preference has become the party line for opponents of the
practice, most of whom have foreign ties or are even foreign
lobbies. Domestic opponents such as the Justice Department
make the attack on the grounds that such practices are
market-disrupting influences and should be subject to
repeal under the anti-trust laws. Proponents of Cargo
2)
Preference still maintain that the costs associated with it
are justifiable in terms of the "national defense benefits ••.
to be derived."J9
These events have brought Cargo Preference to a
critical point in its development, Now an examination of
the real impact of Cargo Preference is required to make a
decision that is not emotionally involved or prejudiced
by vested interests.
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IV. THE IIVIPACT OF CARGO PREFERENCE
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF FEDERAL AID
It was previously asserted that federal aid to the U.S.
Merchant Marine was required to ensure its survival. JUdging
from the performance of the merchant marine recently, it is
obvious that aid has not been as effective as it could have
been. Table 3 demonstrates the decline of the carriage of
trade by the U.S. flag merchant fleet which has been quite
steady. In its current form U.S. maritime policy is, in fact,
inhibiting the merchant marine and needs to be restructured
considerably. In this chapter, drawbacks of current federal
programs will be briefly examined followed by an in-depth
discussion of the effectiveness of Cargo Preference.
"United States maritime policy has effective-
ly kept the U.S. from employing the ~8st
economical factors of production • . . "
"Despite all the legislation affecting the
nation's maritime interests adopted during
its 200-year history, the United Stat~s
still lacks a national cargo policy." I
"Policies have fallen short of the legis-
lative objective of having a U.S. fleet
which carries a substantial portion of
the U.S. foreign trade and provides an
adequate, well-balanced fleet fpr national
defense and national security."42
"A national cargo policy should define
clearly what the government could and
would do to work with American shippers
and U.S. flag lines in order to give
preference to U.S. flag ships, providing
freight rates and service are at least
comparable to those offered by foreign
shipping lines. ,,43
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1955
226.2
53·1
57.6 48.2 45.2 42.3 39.8 34.3 29.1 27.5 23·5
1256 _ 19.57 _ 1958 _ 1959 _ 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964
TABLE 3
U.S. OCEANBORNE FOREIGN TRADE/COMMERCIAL CARGO CARRIED
TbNNAGE (Millions)
1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954
142.2 139·0 133.2 117.5 193.1 187.9 178.0 177.0
81.9 67.0 60.0 49.7 76.8 64.4 51.7 48.7
TOTAL TONS
U.S. FLAG TONS
PERCENT OF TOTAL
CALENDAR YEAR
CALENDAR YEAR
TOTAL TONS
U.S. FLAG TONS
PERCENT OF TOTAL
CALENDAR' YEAR
260.1 289.3 253.3 267.0 227.9 272.~ 296.8 311.6 332.8
53.9 50.8 30.9 27.1 31.0 26.3 29.6 28.5 30.5
20.7 17.6 12.2 10.2 11.1 9.7 10.0 9.2 9·2
1~ _ 1966 ~267 1968 _ 1969 _ 1970 _ 1921 1972 1973
TOTAL TONS 371.3 392.3 387.6 418.6 427.5 473.2 457.4 513.6 631.6
U.S. FLAG TONS
PERCENT OF TOTAL
27.7
7.5
26.2
6.7
20.5
5.3
25.0
6.0
19.8
4.6
25.2
5.3
24.4
5.3
23.8
4.6
39·9
6.3
CALENDAR YEAR 1974__ 1975 _ 1976 1971 1978 1979 1980
TOTAL TONS
U.S. FLAG TONS
PERCENT OF TOTAL
628.9 615.6 698.8 775.3 775.6 823.1 772.2
40.9 31.4 33.8 34.8 32.1 35.0 28.2
6.~_ 5.Q _~.8_ _ 4.5_ 4.1 4.2 3.7
Source: U.S. Maritime Administration annual reports.
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The lack of policy and well-defined goals has prevented
federal aid from succeeding. It is one thing to support the
merchant marine by being generous with financial assistance,
but if that assistance has no direction or aim it is tanta-
mount to throwing money away. "Easy money" has a way of
working against itself in that it, "basically discourages
high risk and imaginative operations, and does not include
any kind of incentives. ,,44 If Cargo Preference is to be
successful as an aid, it must be consistently practiced in a
goal-oriented fashion.
Restrictive regulations provide another reason why the
U.S. Merchant Marine cannot hope to compete with foreign
shipping. There are so many restrictions and agencies en-
forcing them that the merchant marine is unable to carryon
those very practices which have ensured the growth of the
foreign industry. "It is logical that the fewer restraints
imposed on such trade, the greater the volume that would be
available for movement by oceangoing shipping. ,,45 True,
Cargo Preference is an artificial influence on the free-
market system and our domestic laws do not encourage this,
but it must be restated that international shipping is not
really free.
The major pro~lem that federal aid has caused is the
almost complete dependence of the U.S. Merchant Marine on
such aid for its existence. It is ironic that in attempt-
ing to promote the growth of the maritime industry, federal
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aid and regulation has had the opposite effect in that, "to
the extent that a viable merchant marine is the goal, a
fleet dependent upon subsidy, preference, and protection is
its antithesis. ,,46 Unfortunately, in our system of govern-
ment and with our standards of living, there is virtually no
way the U.S. Merchant Marine can exist without federal aid,
especially in the form of Cargo Preference.
"A well-balanced merchant marine and a
prosperous innovative maritime industry
are considered vital components of U.S.
seapower. However, U.S. shipping con-
tinues to experience substantially
higher operating and capital costs than
its foreign competitors. Over a pro-
longed period this competition has led
to a general decline in the capability
of the U.S. Merchant Marine. The
Congress has attempted to foster develop-
ment and encourage maintenance of the U.S.
Merchant Marine through ~assage of cargo
preference legislation." 7
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THE IMPORTANCE OF CARGO PREFERENCE
"The cargo preference system is the
principal form of federal assistance
to the U,S 4 merchant shippingindustry." 8
In defining Cargo Preference it was stated that the un-
subsidized sector of the merchant marine was totally depend-
ent on government-generated cargo while the subsidized
sector was dependent for a large part of its cargo, Simply
stated, without Cargo Preference the unsubsidized fleet
would cease to exist with few exceptions and the subsidized
fleet would be seriously hurt. Though preference cargo
accounts for only a small fraction of the total volume of
all U.S. imports/exports, it accounts for over 80% of outbound
U.S. oceanborne cargo shipments. 49
Due to the size of our merchant marine, the allotted
percentage of preference cargo cannot always be carried by
U.S. ships. This leaves a rather generous portion of govern-
ment-generated cargo for foreign vessels. 5 0 Since, "our cargo
preference requirements, unlike those of many other countries,
do not affect purely commercial cargoes,,,51 there is still a
vast cargo resource. Cargoes which have been affected by
Cargo Preference laws are listed in Table 4.
The benefits to be derived from Cargo Preference are
essentially the same as those discussed Qn Chapter II. In
Table 5, estimates of benefit/cost figures are presented
from 1958 to 1967 which cast a favorable light on the U.S.
Merchant Marine. Presently, the benefit/cost ratio is more
likely to be closer to unity using the same methodology,
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Maritime Admini-
stration Annual
Reports
Inter-American Development
Bank
Peace Corps
General Services
Administration
u.S. Information Agency
(now I.C .A.)
Drug Enforcement
Administrat ion
Ecological Survey
Environmental Protection
Agency
Federal Aviation
Administration
International Exchange
Service
Smithsonian Institution
U.S. Travel Service
Export-Import Bank
Action
Board of International Broadcasting
Agency for International Development
Loans and Grants
P.L. 480-Title II
Department of Agriculture
P.L. 480-Title I
Other Agriculture Programs
Department of Commerce
Industry and Trade Administration
Maritime Administration
Other Agencies
Department of Defense
Military Assistance Program
Foreign Military Sales Credit
Corps of Engineers-NEGEV
Department of Energy
Bonneville Power Administration
Strategic Petroleum Reserve
Department of Health and Human
Services
Department of the Interior
Bureau of Reclamation
Other Agencies
Department of Justice
National Aeronautics and Space
Administration
Tennessee Valley Authority
Department of the Treasury
Chrysler Corporation
Other Agencies
Department of Transportation
Federal Highway Administration
Urban Mass Transportation Admini-
stration
Other Agencies
International Communications Agency
Department of State
Sinai Support Mission
Foreign Building Office
Other Agencies (does not include AID)
Other Agencies
Public Resolution 17 Cargoes: Source:
TABLE 4
MAJOR GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED CARGOES
Public Law 664 Cargoes: OTHER AGENCIES (PAST):
Shipper
30
TABLE 5
Benefit/Cost Analysis of the U.S.
Merchant Marines 1958-1967
(Dollars in Millions)
Benefits Costs*
Balance of National Rate Ship Exchange Net
Year Payments Security+ Total ODS Preferencet Programt Total Benefits
1967 $999 $400 $1,399 $2Zf.6 $68 $64 $348 $1,051
1966 912 400 1,312 199 76 44 319 993
1965 632 400 1,032 185 68 38 291 741
1964 680 400 1,080 204 77 52 333 747
1963 631 400 1,031 192 79 47 318 713
1962 659 400 1,059 178 59 32 269 790
1961 551 400 951 167 50 12 231 720
1960 715 400 1,115 163 54 12 229 886
1959 748 400 1,148 159 37 -- 196 952
1958 758 400 1,158 141 31 -- 172 986
Total $7,285 $4,000 $11,285 $1,806 $599 $301 $2,706 $8,579
* CDS has been omitted from costs because it is a
subsidy solely to shipyards.
+ Average per year; does not reflect nonquantifiable "availability" factor.
t Indirect subsidies.
Source: Barker, J.R. and Brandwein, Robert. The United States Merchant Marine in
National Perspective.
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because the costs associated with Cargo Preference are
significantly higher now. It is considerably easier to
present cost estimates in this case than it is to present
estimates for benefits which are largely non-quantifiable.
The costs will now be examined so thata~eans of improving
Cargo Preference can be proposed.
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COSTS OF CARGO PREFERENCE
Practically all of the costs associated with Cargo Pre-
ference come as a result of the practice of rate preference.
These costs occur because of the higher-than-world market
rates that the unsubsidized merchant fleet is required to
charge for its services (about twice the rate foreign flag
vessels charge for government-generated cargo.)52 The U.S.
taxpayer, shipper, and consumer end up sharing the burden of
the costs of Cargo Preference. These costs are appreciable
totalling about $5 billion between 1952 and 1972, making
Cargo Preference the most expensive form of federal assist-
ance. 53 In Table 6, Gerald Jantscher's estimates of the costs
of Cargo Preference are presented. Table 7 exhibits the break-
down for the Military Sealift Command costs and current figures
are added to demonstrate the fact that the price tag for Cargo
Preference is getting bigger all the time. Figure 1 illus-
trates the nature of the growth of the costs of federal aid
from 1954 through 1967 with Cargo Preference accounting for the
largest portion.
The cost differential caused by rate preference has
several undesirable effects. The Department of Defense, by
far the largest consumer of U.S. flag shipping,54 pays approxi-
mately twice as much for shipping on unsubsidized vessels as
it would pay for foreign shipping. 55 For shipments under
P.L. 480, the additional costs for shipping on U.S. vessels
are not paid by the foreign buyer, but are in fact absorbed
by the shipper, producer, and taxpayer. 56 As a result of this,
the general price level for all a producer's goods is likely
to increase.5 7
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TABLE 6
COST OF CARGO PREFERENCE
Estimate of
Program or Agency Time Period Cargo Preference Cost
Military Sealift Command 1952 to 1972 $3.8 Billion
Public Law 480, Title I, Food 1955 to June 1971 840.1 Million
for Peace Sales Program
Public Law 480, Title II, Food 1954 to 1972 125.0 Million
for Peace Donations
Foreign Aid Cargoes-- 1948 to 1970 600.0 Million
AID Loans and Grants
Source: Jantscher, Gerald R. Bread Upon the Waters: Federal Aids to the
Maritime Industries.
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TABLE 7
Commerical Payments by Military Sealift Command
for Space Aboard Liners and Charter of Vessels, and
Imputed Cargo Preference Laws Subsidy, Fiscal Years
1952-72, Plus-Calculations for Fiscal Years 1979-82
Millions of Dollars
Commercial Payments
Fiscal
Year
For space
aboard liners
For charter
of vessels Total
Imputed subsidy
due to cargo
preference laws
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
141.·4
172.8
146.5
142.5
150·9
177.6
174.9
179.6
163.0
153.0
189.2
203.2
204.9
202.1
261.8
300.9
317.7
366.1
343.9
306.9
305.4
250.0
253.8
163.9
66.2
58.7
37.4
43.0
63.1
54.5
61.8
84.3
82.7
88.9
90.1
255.9
371.6
479.3
480.3
435.2
340.9
315 ~o
397.4
426.6
310.3
208.7
209.6
215.0
217.8
242.6
217·5
214.8
273.6
285.9
293.8
292.2
517.7
672.5
797.0
846.4
779.1
647.9
620.4
198.7
213.3
155.2
104.3
104.8
107.5
108.9
121.3
108.7
1.01.4
136.8
143.0
146.9
146.1
258.9
294.1
341.3
342.7
279.5
201.2
175.8
Total 4,610.2 4,076.4 8,686.7 3,796.3
408.5
534.2
626.6
716.5
Total
817.0
1,068.3
1,253.1
1,433.0
. Source: Jantscher, Gerald R. Bread Upon the Waters. Federal Aids
to the Maritime Industries. Imputed SUbsidy
UsingJ~t~cher's
Methodology
Fiscal Year
1979
1980
1981
1982
Source: Defense Transportation Journal, years 1980 thru 1983.
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Route preference does have an effect on the costs
associated with subsidized shipping that should also be con-
sidered. There is no real way of measuring the effects, but
it may inferred that the presence of guaranteed cargo for a
U.S. member of a liner conference will tend to cause that
member to price his services in an oligopolistic or even mono-
polistic fashion. 58 With Cargo Preference as a backup, the
liner conference member can hold out for higher conference
rates.
other less quantifiable costs of Cargo Preference may pro-
vide the strongest argument against the practice of rate pre-
ference. First and most important is the fact that rate pre-
ference provides no incentive for the unsubsidized fleet to
modernize or increase productivity. This guarantees an aging
and inefficient fleet. 59 Rate preference also tends to cause
waste. Because cargo is assured, the demand for space on ships
having rate preference is less elastic and all available space
might not be utilized. 60 On the other hand, there are simply
not enough bulk and tanker vessels left in the unsubsidized
sector to carryall of the preference cargo allotted. 61 Per-
haps the most shameful waste results as the Military Sealift
Command uses less of its chartered vessels in order to support
privately-owned and operated shipping. 62 With all of the costs
and waste associated with U.S. flag shipping, potential
customers-given the option-will logically choose foreign
flag shipping. Further, the costs of "shipping American"
may influence potential foreign buyers to decide against
"buying American. ,,63
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costs of Cargo Preference and the limitedGiven all the
tangible benefits, how is it possible to defend the
practice? Though most of the arguments in favor of Cargo
Preference have been discounted, it is impossible to fully
discount the value of the U.S. Merchant Marine as a vital
element in our national defense. The decline of our
country's international stature and economic dominance has
gone hand in hand with the decline of the merchant marine.
Without Cargo Preference (especially in the form of route
preference) the U.S. Merchant Marine would lose its strong-
est form of support. Cargo Preference could of course use
some improvement to ensure that the necessary sacrifice
does not become too great.
37
v. THE FUTWE OF CARGO PREFERENCE
Cargo Preference has been described as a "less poli-
tically objectionable,,64 form of federal aid. The costs
of Cargo Preference are off-budget costs which, though
appreciable, are not as acutely felt as direct subsidies.
Most of the rhetoric generated against the practice origi-
nates from concerns which have foreign interests excluded
from the U.S. preference trade. Clever foreign lobbying
and use of this country's own laws and regulations has in-
fluenced even domestic concerns to take up the fight against
Cargo Preference. Paradoxically, the foreign interests are
not about to relinquish their own Cargo Preference provisions.
Unlike our own system of government which allows even hostile
foreign nations to exert direct pressure through lobbying and
other means on our policymaking process, foreign nations do
not generally allow other nations to voice their conflicting
opinions so effectively.
Recently, the Code of Conduct for Liner Conferences pro-
posed by UNCTAD has forced the U.S. to think in an inter-
national way about Cargo Preference. The "cargo sharing" pro-
visions of this code would imply that all but military pre-
ference cargo would be eliminated in favor of a more balanced
trade. 65 The U.S. does not currently intend to accept the
Code, although the Code is really a more favorable form of
Cargo Preference for the U.S. in that the 40-40-20 cargo
sharing formula covers all cargo including commercial cargoes
not covered by our domestic Cargo Preference law. This means
that 40% of all liner conference trade between ourselves and
another country would be reserved for U.S. flag vessels-which
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is a great deal more than is currently carried. This
would provide an incentive for the U.S. to build more ships
and employ more personnel to handle the increased trade.
Therefore, the UNCTAD Code is in fact another type of Cargo
Preference which could benefit the U.S. Since the U.S. will
not become party to the Code, it will have to rely on domestic
Cargo Preference laws to protect its interests.
It is likely that the U.S. will not increase the extent
of its Cargo Preference laws due to political pressure. For
the same reasons, the laws will not be diminished either.
Though there are occasional signs of hope, jUdging from past
performance things will change as slowly as before. Nonetheless,
proposals to improve our merchant marine are always welcome,
though sometimes a bit idealistic.
Proposals for the future of Cargo Preference have in-
cluded the total or partial elimination of Cargo Preference,
the increase of Cargo Preference, the allowance of foreign
building with Cargo Preference privileges, the offering of
Cargo Preference to only the unsubsidized sector, and the
creation of performance-based subsidies. Each of these pro-
posals alone will not accomplish the goal of a strong merchant
marine. The best solution could be a hybrid of these suggestions.
In treating each proposal singly the best and the worst
features of each are highlighted.
Total or partial elimination Cargo Preference means all
or some of the merchant marine will suffer. Elimination of
rate preference will cause the unsubsidized sector to lose
its bread and butter. Rate preference, however, is the weakest
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aspect of Cargo Preference and could be removed with the
least amount of damage, due to the already decrepit state of
the unsubsidized fleet. Extension of subsidies to vital com-
ponents of the unsubsidized fleet could fill the void left by
the elimination of rate preference. Route preference, on the
other hand, has to be maintained to ensure cargo for the en-
couragement of maintaining any fleet at all.
The increase of Cargo Preference is, as stated previously,
not a popular or practical idea: in the U.S. today. This
would entail costs so great that the merchant marine might
price itself out of existence. Further, there is no in-
centive inherent in this method. Perhaps a stepped increase
in route preference toa particular company based on performance
and the importance of the route would be more acceptable.
Recently foreign building was revived as an issue and is
now a fact with which the U.S. Merchant Marine will have to
abide. With foreign building, the existing fleet will have
increased cheaper competition which will be eligible to re-
ceive Cargo Preference benefits. This is actually good for
several reasons. First the competition and the availability
of cheaper, more efficient shipping should cause some activity
in the merchant marine. Secondly, the U.S. will be able to
carry more of its preference cargo and commercial trade,
favorably affecting the balance of payments. Finally, some
U.S. owners of flag-of-convenience vessels could be influ-
enced to rejoin the U.S. fleet adding immeasurably to the
existing fleet. The only drawbacks to foreign building are
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the problems it causes for U.S. shipyards which need to be
maintained at least for defense purposes.
One of the issues in the Cargo Preference debates was
The practice of "double sUbsidy," It has been proposed that
Cargo Preference should only be offered to unsubsidized
operators. The removal of preference cargo from the sub-
sidized sector would be detrimental to its profitability and
could discourage expansion or modernization if no cargo was
assured. Proportional reductions in subsidy or repayments for
"double subsidy" vessels seems more practical.
The creation of performance-based subsidies appears to be
an excellent idea. The stagnant nature of the U.S. Merchant
Marine has been caused by the lack of incentive and the pre-
sence of a continuous flow of' "no-strings" aid. Forcing the
merchant marine to work for the aid it receives is logical,
provides tangible incentive for growth and technological
development, and is much less costly.
A realistic proposal for aiding the U.S. Merchant Marine
should include aspects of all the previous proposals and more.
It is my opinion that the eventual elimination of rate pre-
ference (with direct subsidy for vital tanker/bulk operators),
a performance-based extension of route preference, allowance
of a preset quota of foreign building, reduction or repayment
of "double sUbsidy" benefits, removal of most u.S. restrictive
regUlations, and formation of a strong and definitive u.S.
maritime policy would go a long way towards the recuperation
of the U.S. Merchant Marine. I also believe the proposal
would be acceptable toa.greater cross-section of government
41
and industry because it incurs less costs, requires less
government intervention, and inspires the kind of
competition that encourages growth.
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CONCLUSION
Cargo Preference, like any other form of federal aid,
has its associated costs and drawbacks. It could stand
extensive "tailoring" to the real needs of the U.S.
Merchant Marine, but it most definitely is necessary to
ensure the survival of the U.S. flag merchant fleet at
this time. Until a major restructuring of the merchant
marine occurs and we assume a more objective view of the
intrinsic value of this resource, the costs will be high
and the industry will continue to depend on artificial
assistance. The task before is to arrive at a maritime
policy that is capable of fostering effective support
for our once proud and tradition-filled U.S. Merchant
Marine.
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